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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






WILLIAM C. PEAKE 
 




PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, 
a department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
 
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-01761) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 29, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 






AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 William C. Peake appeals from an entry of summary judgment in favor of his 
former employer, the Pennsylvania State Police, on his claim of race discrimination in 
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  For the 
reasons noted below, we affirm. 
I. 
 William C. Peake is an African American who enlisted in the Pennsylvania State 
Police in May 2009.  Prospective troopers are required to complete an 18-month 
probationary period, composed of 6 months of formal education at the State Police 
Training Academy and a 12-month field training program at a patrol station.  The latter 
includes periodic written evaluations of the trooper’s performance and a General 
Investigation Report (the “Investigation Report”).  The Investigation Report is conducted 
approximately 7 or 8 months into the field training program and is used to determine 
whether a probationary officer should be retained.  A Probationary Trooper Review Panel 
reviews the Investigation Report, and if the trooper is found to be deficient, a separate 
review by the Probationary Trooper Administrative Review Panel (the “Administrative 
Review Panel” or “Panel”) occurs.1  The latter Panel makes its recommendation to the 
Commissioner of the State Police, who makes the final decision regarding trooper 
retention.  
In November 2009 Peake successfully completed his formal education at the 
Police Academy.  He was 1 of 4 African Americans of the 88 graduates in his cadet class.  
                                              
1 The Probationary Trooper Review Panel consists of captains and lieutenants.  The 




After graduation the State Police assigned Peake, along with 7 white probationary 
officers from his cadet class, to the Uniontown, Pennsylvania barracks of Troop B for his 
field training.  The other 3 African Americans from Peake’s cadet class were assigned to 
barracks in Eastern Pennsylvania. 
On November 3, 2010, the scheduled end of his probationary period, Peake was 
terminated from the State Police.  His letter of termination stated “that as a result of [his] 
lack of solid job knowledge and basic police skills, along with officer/public safety 
concerns, [he] [did] not meet the standards set forth of a Pennsylvania State Police 
Trooper.”  App. 27.  The Commissioner relied on the recommendation of the 
Administrative Review Panel in making the decision to terminate Peake.  The Panel 
found several factors as grounds for dismissal, including mishandled accident 
investigations, reports with errors and incorrect information, written and oral 
communication problems, and competency concerns voiced by supervisors, colleagues, 
and outside agency personnel.  Id. at 72–76.  The Panel’s recommendations were based 
on the Investigation Report conducted by Corporal Michael Irwin, Peake’s immediate 
supervisor.  It noted several deficiencies and misconduct.  First, Corporal Irwin found 
that Peake had treated two “reportable” traffic accidents, where an occupant is seriously 
injured or the vehicle must be towed, as “non-reportable” accidents.  Second, despite 
multiple remedial courses in police report writing, Peake continued to turn in reports that 
had spelling and grammatical errors and inaccurate factual representations.  Third, he 
submitted late reports and missed magistrates’ hearings, two of which resulted in charges 
being dropped.  Fourth, Peake had oral communication problems when excited.   
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The only other individual from Peake’s cadet class to be terminated at the 
conclusion of the probationary period was Trooper #9, a white male assigned to Troop M 
in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.  Prior to Trooper #9’s dismissal, however, he was given a 
written action plan and extensions that totaled in excess of 7 months.  Additionally, 
several other probationary officers in Troop B were given extensions to bring up their 
performance standards.  None of the other probationary officers in Troop B were 
terminated at the conclusion of the probationary period.  Peake argues that he was given 
less favorable treatment than Trooper #9 and the other probationary troopers in Troop B 
because he is African American. 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the State Police and 
dismissed the action. 
II. 
 The District Court had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 “We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment.”  
Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dept. of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 2015) (citation 
omitted).  “To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must 
demonstrate ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”  Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 559 (3d Cir. 
2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  A material fact is one that would affect “the 
outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law.”  Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 
410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
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(1986)).  When determining whether there is an issue of material fact, we must review the 
record and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party.  Shelton, 775 F.3d at 
559. 
III. 
 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  
Claims of discrimination in violation of Title VII are analyzed under the familiar burden-
shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  First, 
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.  See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of 
Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999).  To do so, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
that he (1) was a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified for the position, (3) 
suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances of the adverse 
employment action imply discrimination.  Id. at 410–11.  “Once a plaintiff under Title 
VII establishes a prima facie case, the employer must come forward with a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision.”  Goosby v. Johnson & 
Johnson Med., Inc., 228 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs 
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–56 (1981)).  “If the employer is able to proffer a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
the proffered reason was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.”  Id. (citing 
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod. Inc., 530 U.S. 2097 (2000)). 
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The District Court found that Peake had not made out his prima facie case for race 
discrimination because he had not established his termination gave rise to an inference of 
discrimination.  Peake v. Pennsylvania State Police, No. 12-1761, 2015 WL 3646446, at 
*3–6 (W.D. Pa. June 10, 2015).  Specifically, he had not introduced any similarly situated 
comparators and could not show a causal link between his membership in a protected 
class and the adverse employment action.  Id.  Further, the Court concluded that, even if 
Peake had established a prima facie case, summary judgment would nonetheless be 
appropriate because he was unable to rebut, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
State Police’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination were not a pretext for 
discrimination.  Id. at *6–8. 
We begin by determining whether Peake introduced any valid comparator to 
establish his termination as inferring discrimination.  An unlawful inference of 
discrimination can be shown by identifying a similarly situated individual, outside of the 
protected class, who engaged in the same conduct and was treated more favorably.  
Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 706 F.3d 157, 170 (3d Cir. 2013).  “In order to 
determine who might qualify as a similarly situated employee we must look to the job 
function, level of supervisory responsibility and salary, as well as other factors relevant to 
the particular workplace.  This determination requires a court to undertake a fact-
intensive inquiry on a case-by-case basis rather than in a mechanistic and inflexible 
manner.”  Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 2004). 
Peake argues that at least 3 or 4 probationary troopers in Troop B, all of whom 
were white, were similarly situated comparators that were treated more favorably than he 
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was.  Specifically, he claims that these individuals had a combination of at-fault 
automobile accidents, inferior productivity to his own, and instances involving bodily 
harm to the public.  As noted above, Peake’s dismissal was due to mishandled accident 
investigations, deficiencies in report writing, written and oral communication difficulties, 
and competency concerns voiced by those who observed him.  His dismissal was not 
attributable to any of the areas of misconduct by the other 3 or 4 probationary officers in 
Troop B.  Further, Peake cannot offset his deficiencies by noting areas in which he 
outperformed some of his colleagues in Troop B. 
Peake also attempts to compare himself to Trooper #9, a white individual from 
Troop M in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania.  He asserts Trooper #9 had deficient driving skills, 
difficulties becoming familiar with the geographic area of his patrol region, difficulties 
with report writing, trouble in conducting magistrate’s hearings, and had at one time 
fallen asleep while driving.  Although Peake and Trooper #9 each were deficient in report 
writing, their performance problems were dissimilar.  The most distinguishing feature 
between Peake and Trooper #9, however, is that their evaluative processes were 
conducted by different people because they were assigned to different barracks.  The 
Investigation Report Corporal Irwin produced was a result of previously written 
evaluations and interviews with supervisors, coaches, district justices, and other people 
with whom Peake worked.  It was based on a compilation of information coming from 
people who had a direct relationship with Peake and who were able to observe fully his 
behavior as a prospective trooper.  We find it significant that 13 out of the 19 individuals 
interviewed pertaining to Peake’s performance recommended that he not be retained.  
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Indeed, not a single individual recommended retention.  Trooper #9 only had 1 individual 
out of 16 recommend that he not be retained.  Unlike Peake, Trooper #9 had 5 people 
recommend an extension of his probationary period.  Given that Peake and Trooper #9 
were assigned to different barracks, had different supervisors, had different individuals 
interviewed with regard to their retention, and had different deficiencies, we conclude 
that Trooper #9 is not similarly situated to Peake. 
We also agree with the District Court that even if Peake had established his prima 
facie case of race discrimination, summary judgment was still in order because he did not 
show that the State Police’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for dismissal were a 
pretext for racial discrimination.  See id. at *6–7.   
To survive summary judgment when the employer has 
articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its 
action, the plaintiff must point to some evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, from which a factfinder could reasonably 
either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate 
reasons[,] or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative 
cause of the employer's action. 
 
Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 644 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir.1994)).  To discredit the employer’s 
articulated reason for the adverse employment action, the plaintiff must “point to 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the 
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons such that a reasonable factfinder could rationally 
find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the proffered nondiscriminatory 
reason did not actually motivate the employer’s action.”  Id. at 644 (citations omitted) 
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(internal quotations and alteration omitted).  To show that an invidious discriminatory 
reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer’s 
action, “the plaintiff must point to evidence with sufficient probative force that a 
factfinder could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that [race] was a 
motivating or determinative factor in the employment decision.”  Id. at 644–45 (quoting 
Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997)).  Examples 
include showing that the employer has previously discriminated against the plaintiff, that 
the employer has discriminated against members of the plaintiff’s protected class or 
another protected class, or that similarly situated people not within plaintiff’s class were 
treated more favorably.  Id. at 645 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). 
 Peake makes several attempts to undermine the State Police’s legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons for termination.  He claims termination at the end of the 12-
month training period was “rare” (Opening Br. at 5).  He also asserts that he was put on 
desk duty for the final 2 months of his probationary period in violation of the State 
Police’s written protocol.  Next, Peake contends that he was not provided a written action 
plan despite this being common if a trooper was not improving quickly enough.  Finally, 
he notes a contradiction between the termination letter sent to him, which stated he 
lacked “basic police skills,” and a category in his final probationary trooper evaluation 
with the same name in which he received a rating of “satisfactory” (Opening Br. at 12).   
We agree with the District Court that Peake failed to satisfy either prong of the 
Fuentes pretext analysis.  As for the first prong, Peake’s reasons demonstrating pretext in 
no way concern the negative evaluations of his performance as a probationary trooper.  
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The only inconsistency he can point to is his termination letter, which stated he lacked 
basic police skills, and his final trooper evaluation form that rated him as satisfactory in 
the category of basic police skills.  The Court found the terms had different meanings in 
their respective contexts.  In the termination letter, basic police skills was more general 
and referred to the factors the review panels used in recommending Peake’s dismissal.  In 
the probationary evaluation forms, the term was used in a more specific sense.  That it 
was rare for a probationary trooper not to be retained at the end of the 12-month training 
program, that Peake was not provided a written action plan, and that he was placed on 
desk duty, in no way suggests that the State Police’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reasons for termination are “unworthy of credence.”  Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644.   
With respect to the second prong, Peake does not contend the State Police 
previously discriminated against him.  Further, he does not claim that it discriminated 
against any other member of his class or any other member of a protected class.  He does 
contend, however, that similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were 
treated more favorably than he was.  Based on the discussion above, we conclude that 
Peake did not present any valid comparator.  Therefore, he does not satisfy the second 
prong of the Fuentes pretext analysis. 
* * * * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 
 
 
 
